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Abstract The objective is to contribute to the discussion on property tax
inequity by employing the methodologies developed to test for
vertical inequity in a tax system that currently does not rely on
some form of market value in the assessment process. There is
strong evidence that the property tax and the ‘‘True Tax Value’’
assessment procedure employed in Indiana contains progressive
vertical inequities rather than regressive inequities as is typically
perceived. This is unique, as previous ﬁndings tend to support
the notion that the property tax is regressive. It provides
potentially pertinent information in light of the ongoing
discussion surrounding the restructuring of Indiana’s property tax
assessment and property tax debates elsewhere.
Introduction
Ad-valorem taxes on real property are a continuing source of controversy and
debate among the general public and the academic community. Public attitude
surveys consistently reveal that the property tax is considered one of the ‘‘worst’’
forms of taxation in terms of equity (Aaron, 1975). The distaste for the property
tax has contributed to a relative decline in its reliance over the last ninety-ﬁve
years. The percentage of local general revenue produced by the property tax has
declined from more than 70% in 1902 to less than 30% by 1986 (Fisher, 1996).
The concern over the property tax is illustrated by a number of legal battles and
legislative motions recently carried out across the country that challenge
components of the property tax system. In Florida, a lawsuit was ﬁled in 1990
challenging the fairness of the property tax system resulted in an amendment to
the constitution that caps the annual growth of real property assessed values (Metz,
1995). In Oregon, legislation was adopted in 1995 to simplify the property tax
appeals process in favor of property owners. In Michigan, local school reliance
on the property tax was eliminated and reallocated to the state level. And in 1996,
the Indiana Tax Court, under Judge Thomas Fisher, found in favor of a group of
community activists charging the State’s property tax assessment system based on
‘‘true tax value’’ was unconstitutional. The Fisher ruling has initiated a spate of322  Smith
discourse and subsequent rulings that call for restructuring the property tax
assessment system in Indiana from a system based on true tax value to a system
that relies on market value.
Academic debate has focused on such issues as the level of the property tax,
administration and assessment procedures, the regressive or progressive nature of
the tax and the equity of the tax both vertically and horizontally (Benson and
Schwartz, 1997). This article focuses on the role of assessment in addressing
vertical equity in the property tax. While there have been numerous empirical tests
of assessment practice, all have involved states that rely on some deﬁnition of
market value in the assessment process. This study seeks to extend the literature
on property tax inequity by testing for inequality in the Indiana tax system. Indiana
is one of only thirteen states that restricts real property assessment to replacement
cost thereby excluding transaction information as a basis for value (DeBoer,
1996).1 A series of models developed over the last twenty years to test for vertical
inequity are employed on assessed value data and on listed residential sales
transactions in the city of Bloomington, Indiana from 1993 through 1998. The
analysis involves comparisons of the assessed value to market value ratio (AV/
MV) across market value ranges in a test of vertical inequity. Inequities are a
basis for arguments in favor of restructuring the property tax system in Indiana
due to the constitutional violation of omitting fair market value from the
assessment process.
An analysis that indicates a direct or inverse relationship between the ratio of
assessed value and market value suggests that there is merit to the discussion in
favor of restructuring the Indiana assessment system on the basis of perceived
inequities in the assessment process. Results that are ambiguous or show no
relationship between real property value and the assessed value to market value
ratio would indicate that there are elements of the assessment process in the
Indiana system that adjust for inequities. The results contained in this study are
unique in that they present the ﬁrst convincing evidence of a state property tax
system that contains progressive inequities. Such ﬁndings present a host of factors
that deserve consideration with any policy proposals to restructure property tax.
The remainder of the article is divided as follows: the following section discusses
the property tax in general and the assessment process in Indiana. The models
and the data utilized to test for vertical inequity are then presented and the ﬁndings
from each model are illustrated. The article concludes with an interpretation of
the ﬁndings and suggestions for further research.
 The Property Tax in Perspective
General Outline
While the property tax is unpopular and often viewed as poorly managed it is
also seen as an essential element in the preservation of the current system ofModels for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  323
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subnational government control (Fisher, 1996). Property taxes typically represent
the principal revenue source under the direction of the local governments.
Proponents in favor of a locally imposed property tax argue that local governments
are most closely tied to local citizens and are consequently best positioned to
provide the bundle of various public services demanded by the residents of the
community. The locally crafted expenditure programs supported by the property
tax will most closely represent the desires of the taxpayers and the local agenda
by using funds generated, collected and administered locally.
When compared to the income and sales tax, the property tax provides a more
stable source of revenue. The stability of the property tax creates a number of
advantages including increased accuracy in budgeting and forecasting of revenues
and expenditures, and ease of collection and administration of the tax. A clear
forecast of revenues allows for more efﬁcient and timely budgeting of programs
and projects. Unlike sales and income taxes, the asset consumed (in this case real
estate) is stationary and identiﬁable. Each taxable parcel of real property can be
identiﬁed and spatially deﬁned. Such ease of identiﬁcation allows for efﬁcient
collection and administration of the tax. In contrast, the collection of sales taxes
and income taxes require the citizens and business owners to act as ‘‘self
reporters.’’ The government must rely on the merits of its citizens to report
accurately and honestly all transactions and/or all income while contending with
the risk of mobility.
The high visibility of the property tax is also considered a disadvantage. Property
taxes may be included with monthly mortgage payments or paid in lump sums;
in either case, it is paid by the taxpayer directly out of pocket. Additionally,
property taxes are assessed on what is typically the household’s biggest
consumption and investment item (Wassmer, 1993). In contrast, the income tax is
extracted by the employer from payroll checks prior to receipt of wages and
appears less painful to people. Similarly, the sales tax is an incremental fee
attached to the cost of goods and services that is often immaterial and goes
relatively unnoticed. Thus, while the revenue collected at the local level may not
differ on the basis of the collection instrument, the magnitude of the property tax
generates a perception of higher cost to the citizens.
Indiana
Discussion of property taxation in Indiana is heightened by the additional concerns
of assessment standards. One issue that has received a great deal of attention is
the size of the assessing district. Indiana’s primary assessing districts are its 1,008
townships; by comparison only ﬁve states, Minnesota, Michigan, New York, North
Dakota and Wisconsin, have more taxing districts. Only eight states have more
than 500 districts with the majority of states relying on county level tax districts.
Supporters of smaller districts (usually sub-county units like townships or
municipalities) claim that small district assessors are more responsive to local
concerns and have a greater knowledge of local property values. On the other324  Smith
hand, supporters of larger districts (usually counties) assert that districts must be
larger to support full time professional assessors and modern equipment. They
claim that larger districts allow greater uniformity, and that fewer districts
statewide would facilitate the state agency’s supervisory efforts (DeBoer, 1996).
The property tax is critically dependent on the tax assessor’s opinions (Clapp,
1990). The quality and administration of assessing the value of property has been
the source of intense discussion around the country and in Indiana speciﬁcally.
Most states mandate tax assessment of real property on some basis of fair market
value or use value, which is fair market value of the property restricted to a speciﬁc
use. One expectation contained in this mandate is the legal requirement of vertical
equity (Benson and Schwartz, 1997). Vertical inequities occur when the effective
tax rates are lower for citizens with a higher ability to pay (regressive), or when
the tax structure results in higher effective tax rates for citizens with higher ability
to pay (progressive) (Mikesell, 1991). State legislators require local assessing
authorities to attain vertical and near horizontal equity in assessment practices.
This requirement frequently carries with it the responsibility of periodic audits,
and comparisons of recent sales to assessed values, with adjustments required
when inconsistencies emerge. Real property in Indiana is assessed on the basis of
true tax value that is produced by application of regulations promulgated by the
Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners. A comprehensive set of rules known
as Regulation 17 is produced every four years for reassessment. The rules explain
in detail the process of determining the true tax value of real property, via
deﬁnitions, charts, tables, photographs, etc. (Hernly, 1997).2 This includes
prescribed values for replacement cost(s) and depreciation, neither of which is
devised with any basis in the market.
In the case Town of St. John, et al. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, the
Court held that Indiana’s reliance on a true tax value methodology was
unconstitutional in that the approach violated a constitutional requirement for a
‘‘just valuation.’’3 The case began in 1993, when a group of Lake County
homeowners ﬁled a lawsuit stating the true tax value system was subjective and
resulted in unequal assessments. The Lake County residents contended that they
were being taxed at a rate ﬁve times higher than homeowners elsewhere in the
state. The Indiana Civil Liberties Union agreed to take up the case.
Indiana Tax Court Judge Thomas Fisher ruled in 1996 that the state’s assessment
system was unconstitutional because it ignored objective, hard data about values
and ordered the state to adopt a fair market value system by March 1998. Judge
Fisher used Article X Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution as a touchstone in his
decision that had the following directive of the state’s property tax system, ‘‘a
system of assessment and taxation characterized by uniformity, equality, and just
valuation based on property wealth.’’ The Fisher ruling was interpreted as
requiring an amendment to the state constitution redeﬁning the basis of assessed
value.
The clause does not require absolute and precise exactitude as to the uniformity
and equality of each individual assessment. Further, property wealth has beenModels for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  325
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interpreted as best represented as use value. In the case of residential assessment,
use value is limited to the value accrued from habitation and has little relationship
to the transaction market. The State of Indiana appealed to the Supreme Court
and won, arguing that Judge Fisher went beyond his authority by requiring an
amendment to the constitution with what was perceived as a narrow interpretation
of the terms uniformity, equality and just. In December 1997, Judge Fisher again
ruled the system was unconstitutional because it was not based on ‘‘real-world’’
objective measures of wealth. It appears the ﬁnal decision in this spate of legal
sessions came on December 4 1998 when the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
state’s property tax assessment law, but said rules and methods for determining
property values were unconstitutional. The decision means the state must rewrite
regulations that many argue are non-uniform and largely subjective and replace
them with rules that are ‘‘uniform and equal.’’ The decision does not force the
state to base assessments on fair-market value nor does the ruling require an
amendment to the constitution. In its ruling, the Supreme Court agreed in part
with previous rulings by Judge Fisher that the assessment system and state laws
under which it was developed were unconstitutional. The high court agreed with
Fisher about the regulations used by the tax board, saying the system lacks
‘‘meaningful reference to property wealth and (results) in signiﬁcant deviations
from substantial uniformity and equality.’’ The court disagreed with Fisher about
the constitutionality of the state law. The court stated the constitution ‘‘does not
mandate the use of strict market value or the use of the three traditional
measurement standards’’—cost, market and income. The constitution only
requires that the results from assessment are uniform and equitable for property
wealth across all property classiﬁcations (Associated Press, 1998). The Supreme
Court’s ruling does require that Indiana’s true tax value assessment system must
consider market value data and that departing from market value must result in
assessments that are ‘‘substantially uniform and equal based on property wealth.’’
What the Supreme Court ruling did was provide the legislature and the State Board
of Tax Commissioners with ﬂexibility in crafting the assessment manuals of the
2000 reassessment.4
The Issue of Interest
In order for the property tax assessment system to be considered equitable it must
meet two conditions: (1) all properties of similar land use and market value are
to be valued equally for tax assessment; and (2) to be equitable, the assessment
process should result in assessment to market value ratios nearly equal for all
properties (Thrall, 1979). Property tax inequities are generally divided into two
forms, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal inequity occurs when homes of equal
value are assessed at different rates. Horizontal variations in assessment value to
market value (AV/MV) ratios are assumed to be present and acceptable within
limits and are attributed to the subjectivity inherent in the assessment process
(Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton, 1990). The general willingness to
accept small variations in horizontal AV/MV ratios is more a function of the326  Smith
variance in the real estate market than it is a function of the subjectivity of the
assessor. Residential buyers and sellers transact in open markets with some level
of information asymmetry that often cannot be eliminated due to the high
transaction costs associated with near perfect information.
Vertical inequity occurs when the AV/MV ratio is not consistent across the range
of property values. Regressive vertical inequity is present when the AV/MV ratios
are higher for low-valued homes than they are for high-valued homes. The
opposite is true with progressive vertical inequity where the higher-valued homes
have a higher AV/MV ratio than the lower-valued homes.
The principal focus in the literature has been to test whether low-valued properties
are over-assessed relative to high-valued properties (a tax structure with regressive
vertical inequities). Such circumstances can arise due to a number of factors
including:
 The frequency of assessment coupled with the rate of change in the
property;
 The subjectivity of the appraiser and the often limited information
relative to characteristics internal to the structure;
 The political environment can inﬂuence the assessment process by
creating an artiﬁcial ceiling on the assessed value of high-valued housing
often owned by citizens with political voice;
 A tendency, on the part of assessors, to center the value estimates to the
mean, a behavior that will increase the estimate for low-valued houses
and decrease the estimate for high-valued housing;
 The limitations inherent in statistical methods employed by assessors to
conduct mass appraisals;
 The limited comparability of marginal properties or those at the extreme
bottom and top in terms of value;
 Spatial spillover effects are often overlooked in valuations due to the
difﬁculty in determining the distance decay of relationships between the
numerous spatially oriented inﬂuences to value (Thrall, 1979; Birch,
Sunderman and Hamilton, 1990; Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and
Hamilton, 1990; and Benson and Schwartz, 1997).
The models employed in the following analysis have yielded inconsistent results
in previous tests of vertical inequity and the one best method remains unconﬁrmed
(see Sirmans, Diskin and Friday, 1995). This only serves to exacerbate the problem
of taxpayer conﬁdence. Such ambiguity reduces motivation for corrective action
when such inequities become apparent through testing. For this reason a number
of the models are tested against the data for Bloomington, Indiana in an attempt
to conﬁrm or dispute the presence of vertical inequity in the Indiana tax system.Models for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  327
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 Models of Vertical Tax Inequity
The Models
There has been a steady progression of models designed to measure the presence
of vertical inequity in the property tax in the academic literature. An overview of
the various models and methodologies has been provided by Sirmans, Diskin and
Friday (1995). Utilizing a constant quality adjusted sample of owner-occupied
residential properties for Miami, Florida from 1991, the authors tested for vertical
inequity by comparison of the prominent models. The results were mixed and
appear dependent on the methodology selected.
The models employed by Benson and Schwartz (1997), Sunderman, Birch,
Cannaday and Hamilton (1990) and Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995) to test for
vertical inequity are presented in Exhibit 1. As suggested previously, the ﬁndings
from the models when applied to the same data sets have been mixed. Further,
no single model has been proven superior over the others. Sirmans et al. (1995)
claim the two most sophisticated models are provided by Clapp (1990) and
Sunderman et al. (1990). The selection of which of the models to use is contingent
on the researcher’s perception or a priori information of the source of error. If one
is conﬁdent that the errors in the variables are more a function of the assessed
value then the piecewise spline model of Sunderman et al. is recommended. If
the belief is that the use of sales price as a proxy for market value is the source
of error in the variables then the instrumental variable in the two-stage Clapp
(1990) model should be applied. Given the uncertainty associated with the models
and the lack of a market value assessment in the Indiana data, the following
analysis will test all the models presented in Exhibit 1. The objectives of this
analysis are twofold: (1) to answer the question does the data suggest the Indiana
assessment process results in inequities; and (2) to test the possibility of obtaining
consistent results with the models utilizing data from a state that does not assess
on a market value basis.
The Data
The data is a compilation of actual sales information from the Bloomington,
Indiana Board of REALTORS matched with assessment information from the
Monroe County Assessor’s ofﬁce.5 The single-family residential sales data covers
a period from January 1993 through June 1998. There are a total of 1,713
observations or approximately 18% of the 9,473 detached, single-family
residential properties within the city limits of Bloomington, Indiana after cleaning
for missing data. To normalize the sales observations to the last assessment year,
1996, a constant quality hedonic model is designed.328  Smith
Exhibit 1  Models for Testing Vertical Inequity
Model Null Hypothesis Author (Date)
AVj  0  1SPj  j
AV/SP  0  1SP
AV  0SP1
AV  0  1SP  2SP 2
lnSP  0  1lnAV
lnSP  0  1lnA
lnAV  0  1Z
AV  00  10SP  01LOW 
02HIGH  11LOWSP  12HISP
  0 0
  0 1
  1 1
    0 02
  1 1
  1 1
      0 00 01 02









AV  Assessed value.
SP  Sales price or some measure of market value.
Z  Dichotomous variable. (Adapted from Sirmans, Diskin and Friday, 1995.)
LOW  Dichotomous variable if sales price is in the lower knot.
HIGH  Dichotomous variable if sales price is in upper knot.
Adapted from Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995).
The hedonic pricing method is used to create hedonic indices for the observed
single family residential real property transactions in Bloomington by comparing
changes and differences across structural and geographic characteristics for each
observation. A hedonic model relates the price of assets to all of the observable
characteristics that affect their value. The model is a standard ordinary least
squares regression and includes those characteristics or attributes as the
independent variables with the sales price of the asset serving as the dependent
variable. Structural characteristics were obtained from the assessor’s records and
the sales listings. Sales observations are geographically located via census
blockgroups and tracts (see Exhibit 2 for variable descriptions). According to
Lancaster (1966), preferences for consumption goods are determined by the utility
people derive from a set of characteristics inherent in those goods that are traded
in private markets. Hedonic models can be used to estimate what price people are
willing to pay to obtain more or less of an individual characteristic (Lyons and
Loveridge, 1993). More speciﬁcally, the hedonic regression model relates the price
of an asset to the attributes (or characteristics) that theoretically affect its value
thereby allowing for recovery of implicit prices of non-market qualities based on
observations of transactions in private markets where a good with weak
complementarity to the attribute in question is traded (Lyons and Loveridge,
1993).Models for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  329
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Exhibit 2  Variable Means and Deﬁnitions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Deﬁnition
LOT 12,051.20 7,443.50 Lot size in square feet
SQUARE 1,872.64 814.65 Square feet of living space
BEDS 3.15 0.81 Total number of bedrooms
BUILT 1,966.36 24.29 The year built
BASEMENT 0.46 0.50 Basement present yes/no
CRAWL 0.50 0.50 Structure on crawl yes/no
FBATH 1.77 0.69 Number of full baths
HBATH 0.47 0.53 Number of half baths
FRONT 85.36 34.79 Linear feet of lot frontage
TRACT16 0.02 0.16 Located in census tract 16
TRACT11 0.07 0.26 Located in census tract 11
TRACT10 0.29 0.46 Located in census tract 10
TRACT902 0.15 0.36 Located in census tract 902
TRACT901 0.04 0.21 Located in census tract 901
TRACT8 0.04 0.19 Located in census tract 8
TRACT7 0.04 0.20 Located in census tract 7
TRACT6 0.05 0.22 Located in census tract 6
TRACT4 0.08 0.27 Located in census tract 4
TRACT302 0.09 0.29 Located in census tract 302
TRACT301 0.10 0.30 Located in census tract 301
TRACT1 0.01 0.08 Located in census tract 1
GARSQ 288.22 255.03 Square feet of garage space
GAR 0.62 0.49 Garage yes/no
CONDITION 4.14 0.44 Assessor’s opinion of condition 1–5
DEROOM 0.13 0.03 Number of baths divided by total rooms
Y93 0.15 0.35 Residence sold in 1993
Y94 0.18 0.39 Residence sold in 1994
Y95 0.16 0.36 Residence sold in 1995
Y96 0.21 0.40 Residence sold in 1996
Y97 0.17 0.38 Residence sold in 1997
Y98 0.14 0.35 Residence sold in 1998
BDRMRAT 0.38 0.07 Number of bedrooms divided by total rooms
b2  b51 various various Dichotomous variable for location of
observation within blockgroup330  Smith
Once the hedonic equation has been speciﬁed, the results are used to produce a
set of price indices for the identiﬁed attributes. There are two major traditions:
‘‘explicit time-variable’’models and ‘‘strictly’’cross-sectional models. The explicit
time-variable approach pools all data across time periods and includes time as an
independent (dichotomous) variable. While there is no formal theoretical directive
for the functional form, a number of studies have relied on this explicit time
variable model for comparing the predictive power of hedonic models with models
of repeat sales and nonparametric models with similar results, achieved with each
format. The general form of this model is as follows (Gatzlaff and Ling, 1994):
kT
ln P   X  cR  e , (1)  it j jit t it it
j1 t1
where:
lnPit  Log of the sales price of residential units i in an arm’s length transaction
at time t, i  1 ,...n, t  1 ,...T;
j  A vector of coefﬁcients on structural and locational attributes Xjit, j  1,
...k;
ct  The time coefﬁcients of Rit time dichotomous variables with values of 1
if the ith house is sold in period t and 0 otherwise; and
eit  The random error with assumed mean  0, and variance 2.6
The house value index I  exp[ct] reﬂects the inter-temporal changes in value * t
as deﬁned in Equation (1).
While there is no theoretically proven functional form, the reliability of hedonic
models is dependent on the speciﬁcation of the regression equation. A frequently
used technique involves entering the variables of interest into quadratic form to
allow for ease of interpretation of ﬁrst and second order effects while entering all
other variables in their linear form. Gatzlaff and Ling (1994) estimated four
explicit time-variable models to evaluate alternative functional forms for a hedonic
model: (1) exponential; (2) semi-log; (3) double-log; and (4) linear.7 The four
functional forms were applied to an observation set and compared on the basis of
the R2 statistic. This approach to selecting functional form is reasonable given that
the variables do not change, but are instead merely transformed.
One directive to assignment of functional form suggests a log transformation on
both the dependent and independent variables while another line of reasoning
limits the independent variable transformations to those variables with a spread
in the range of values that allows for second order interpretation. For example, in
the subject data set the maximum number of bathrooms is seven. It is difﬁcult to
adequately interpret second order effects with values less than ten. Based on theModels for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  331
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ambiguity in the literature and the resulting R2 values, the model selected is in
semi-log form. Thus, the formal model appears as:
kk T
ln P   X   H  cR  e . (2)  it j jit j jit t it it
j1 j1 t1
Where the vector X represents traditional structural and land area characteristics,
H is a set of dichotomous location variables by census blockgroup and again R
is a variable for time. A complete description of the variables included in the
model along with the parameter estimates and relevant statistics is provided in
Exhibits 2 and 3.
Results
Beginning with the initial work of Paglin and Fogarty (1972) their model of
vertical inequity in the property tax is expressed as a linear relationship between
assessed values and market values (Reinmuth, 1977). The model of assessed value
dependent on the sales price is as follows:
AV     SP  e , (3) j 01 jj
where:
AVj  The assessed value of the jth property; and
SPj  The sale price of the jth property.
The estimated equation with the indexed house sales serving as a proxy for market
value is:
AV  7,389.76 0.64 SP (4) (0.000) (0.000)
The probability p-values are provided in parentheses; adj. R2  .75. The variable
of interest in this case is the intercept. Given that there is a linear relationship
proposed, an estimated intercept equal to zero would indicate no vertical inequity.
A positive intercept would suggest a regressive tax structure and a negative
intercept indicates a progressive tax structure. The statistically signiﬁcant estimate
for the intercept in this model is 7,389.76, indicating that the assessment process
in Bloomington, Indiana resulted in a progressive property tax.332  Smith
Exhibit 3  Hedonic Model Results
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Exhibit 3  (continued)
Hedonic Model Results
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Exhibit 3  (continued)
Hedonic Model Results









Note: N  1,713; Adj. R2  .831.
The IAAO (1978) model is based on the assumption that the sales price is a good
indicator of value and that the assessed value to sales price ratio provides the best
indicator of vertical inequity. The model is of the following form:
AV /SP     SP  e . (5) jj 01 jj
The resulting estimated equation is:
 AV/SP  0.50 5.66 e-7 SP. (6) (0.000) (0.000)
Both the intercept and the sales price coefﬁcient are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level and the adj. R2  .02 (Reinmuth, 1977). The interpretation of this linear
model is straightforward. If there is a direct positive relationship between the
assessed value ratio and the sales price, the tax system is said to be progressive,
if the relationship is inverse, the property tax is regressive and if there is no
relationship, the property tax is neutral. The results suggest a statistically
signiﬁcant progressive tax structure for the data. The results, however, are
tempered by the fact that the coefﬁcient is extremely small, suggesting that theModels for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  335
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positive slope, although signiﬁcant, is nearly inconsequential. This would explain,
in part, the relatively small adjusted R2.
Cheng (1974), Kochin and Parks (1982) and Bell (1984) address the use of linear
regression models that prohibit tests of nonlinear conditions. Additionally, there
is the concern of heteroskedasticity, a likely characteristic in this data as the
models are employed on residential house sales. Observed sales represent a subset
of the total real property within a taxing district excluding those units that do not
sell during the period. Both the Cheng, and the Kochin and Parks models rely on
a log transformation. The difference between the two models is that the order of
the dependent and independent variables is reversed. In the Kochin and Parks
model, the sales price is the dependent variable and in the Cheng model the sales
price is the independent variable.8 The Cheng version is of the form:
1 AV   SP . (7) 0
Equation 7 is converted into a linear regression model by converting to the natural
log as:
lnAV     lnSP  e . (8) j 01 jj
The results of the model are as follows:
lnAV  1.17lnSP. 2.60 (9) (0.000) (0.000)
The parameter 1 is the measure of vertical inequity. If 1 is greater than 1 the
property tax is considered progressive, less than 1 and the tax is regressive, equal
to 1 and the tax is neutral. The coefﬁcient estimate from the data 1.17 is
statistically signiﬁcantly greater than 1 as indicated by the p-value from a t-test
in parentheses; adj. R2  .75. The conclusion from this model is that the data
indicate the assessment process is progressive.
The Bell model represents the relationship between assessed value and sales price
in a quadratic form. Bell (1984) argues that there is more error in assessment
practices and consequently assessment value than there is in the market value
estimated from the sales price. Incorporating the quadratic term allows for the
measurement of nonlinear relationships between the assessed value and the sales
price.336  Smith
The Bell model is of the following quadratic form:
2 AV     SP   SP  e . (10) j 01 j 2 jj
Application of the Bell model resulted in the following estimated equation:
2 AV   . 21,420.97 0.86SP 6.78e–7SP (11) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vertical inequity in the Bell model is expressed in the intercept and the quadratic
coefﬁcient. The negative intercept supports the results from the previous models
that the data indicate a progressive tax structure. The coefﬁcient for the quadratic
is, however, contradictory; adj. R2  .76. A negative result for the quadratic
coefﬁcient suggests that as the sales price increases the assessed value to sales
price ratio decreases. The relative size of that decrease is extremely small and the
positive coefﬁcient on SP will offset the decrease caused by the quadratic in all
but the highest valued houses.
In both the Cheng and Bell models, the F-Statistics were statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, indicating that the relationship between the assessed value and
the sales price in the data may not be best represented as linear. The following
two models address this issue of linearity further in testing for vertical inequity.
In response to the debate on which variable, assessed value or sales price, should
serve as the predictor variable, Clapp (1990) proposes a two-stage least squares
model. An instrumental variable Z is formed from two interactive models, ranking
the data by sales price and assessed value. The instrumental variable denoted as
Z incorporates information from both variables and represents a categorization of
the sales price observations coded 1 if the house has both a sales price rank and
an assessed value rank in the highest one-third of the observations, 1i ft h e
house has a sales price and an assessed value rank in the bottom one-third of the
observation set and 0 otherwise (Clapp, 1990).9 Clapp argues that this ranking is
based on the presumption that it is improbable that both assessed values and sales
prices will indicate that a property is in one of the one-third tails of the distribution
of observations unless true market value is in the same portion of the observation
set. Clapp’s presumption is that incorporating information from both variables will
reduce the possibility of chance classiﬁcation of properties in speciﬁed categories
thereby reducing heteroskedasticity.
There is a reasonable theoretical basis for treating the assessed value in this
manner. The costs associated with owning a house are capitalized into the value
of the house. A higher assessment translates into higher property taxes, the costs
of ownership are increased and this cost is negatively capitalized into the valueModels for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  337









































































































































































Exhibit 5  Models for Testing Vertical Inequity
Model Variable Results Conclusion
AVj  0  1SPj  j
Paglin and Fogarty (1972)
0  0 Progressive
AV/SP  0  1SP
IAAO (1978)
1  0 Progressive
AV  0SP1
Cheng (1974)
1  1 Progressive





ln SP  0  1 lnA
ln AV  0  1Z
Clapp (1990)
1  1 Progressive
AV  00  10SP  01LOW  02HIGH
 11LOWSP  12HISP





Note: Adapted from Sirmans, Diskin and Friday, 1995.
of the house (Edelstein, 1979). This interaction suggests that there is a relationship
between assessed value and market value that should be incorporated. An assessed
value that is randomly low (high) will result in biases in sales price in the opposite
direction (Clapp, 1990). The instrumental variable corrects for that bias. The
model has both the selling price and the assessed value as dependent variables as
follows:
lnSP     lnAV  e . (12) j 01 jj
lnAV     Z  e . (13) j 01 jj
The resulting estimated equations are:
lnSP  4.10 0.68lnAV.  (14) (0.000) (0.000)
lnAV  10.96 0.73Z. (15) (0.000) (0.000)Models for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  339
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The interpretation of this model is in the 1 parameter. If 1 is greater than 1,
property taxation is considered regressive, less than 1 and the tax is progressive,
equal to 1 and the tax is neutral or equitable. The parameter estimate from the
data 0.68 is statistically signiﬁcantly less than 1 as indicated by the p-value from
a t-test in parentheses; adj. R2  .75 and .80, respectively. The conclusion from
this model is that the data indicate a progressive assessment process for residential
housing in Bloomington, Indiana.10
The Sunderman, Birch, Cannady and Hamilton (1990) model is based on the
Kochin and Parks, and Bell models and a test by Gaston (1984) that indicated the
possible need for a nonlinear relationship. Speciﬁcally, a plot of the Gaston data
revealed a serpentine or S-shaped relationship with the assessed value on the
vertical axis and the sales price on the horizontal axis (Sunderman et al.). Their
spline model addresses the second curve that would be indicative of the S-shaped
data, and not recognizable by the Bell quadratic model. Spline regression allows
us to view (estimate) multiple slope coefﬁcients for the same independent variable.
The most recent application of the Sunderman, et al. piecewise spline model was
by Benson and Schwartz (1997). Benson and Schwartz ran the model on
observations for Bellingham, Washington for individual years 1990 through 1994,
and for the data over those years indexed to 1994. For the purposes of this study,
there was little information gained from a test output on individual years.
Therefore, the model is applied only to the indexed data set in aggregate. The
format for the spline model is as follows:
AV     SP   LOW   HIGH j 00 10 j 01 j 02 j
  LOWSP   HISP  e , (16) 11 j 12 jj
where:
LOWj  A dichotomous variable equaling one if the sale price on the jth
property is lower than the ﬁrst knot, zero otherwise;
HIGHj  A dichotomous variable equaling one if the sale price on the jth
property is higher than the second knot, zero otherwise;
LOWSPj  The sale price of the jth property if the sale price is lower than the
ﬁrst knot, zero otherwise; and
HIGHSPj  The sale price of the jth property if the sale price is higher than the
second knot, zero otherwise.
The results from the model are as follows:11340  Smith
AV   6,585.59 64,663.65SP 3,660.17LOW
(0.575) (0.000) (0.766)
  . 16,041.05HIGH 0.11LOWSP 0.09HISP
(0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (17)
The coefﬁcients of interest are 00, 01 and 02, the constant, and the coefﬁcients
for LOW and HIGH, respectively. The three represent the intercepts for the three
segments or splines created by the knots. All three are statistically insigniﬁcant
suggesting the data does not exhibit vertical inequity in either direction (adj.
R2  .76). The results of this model may be due to the potential for incorrect
functional form. Exhibit 4 presents a scatter plot of the data with a best-ﬁt second-
degree line. The data does not appear to support an S-shaped distribution, but
rather a log distribution. The test of signiﬁcance for the individual variables
indicates only that the original sales price variable is an indicator of assessed
value in this particular model.
 Conclusion
Because the property tax is often considered a regressive tax, many view the tax
unfavorably. A tax structure is regressive if effective rates are lower in income
segments with a higher ability to pay, progressive if effective rates are higher in
high-ability groups and proportional if effective rates are equitable across groups
(Mikesell, 1991). The objectives of this article were twofold. The ﬁrst goal was
to contribute to the discussion on property tax inequity by employing the
methodologies developed to date to test for vertical inequity in a tax system that
currently does not rely on some form of market value in the assessment process.
This study has examined the issue of vertical inequity in the assessment of single-
family homes in Bloomington, Indiana.
The existing models were applied to a hedonic index of residential sales prices
for the years 1993 through 1998 in the Bloomington, Indiana housing market. The
results were nearly unanimous indicating a progressive assessment system for the
data observed (see Exhibit 5), with reliance on the indexed sales price to proxy
for market value. It is often argued that relying on sales price results in an errors
in variables bias towards results that indicate a regressive assessment structure.
The majority of studies on market value based assessed value properties have
yielded widely mixed results or results suggesting a regressive property tax
structure. This is the ﬁrst study that presents convincing ﬁndings of a progressive
property tax system.
The second goal was to provide new information to serve the debate on
restructuring the property tax in Indiana and elsewhere. What does a progressiveModels for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  341
JRER  Vol. 19  No. 3 – 2000
tax structure mean for the tax-restructuring debate in Indiana? The discussions
have generally been framed on the assumption that the lack of a market value
based assessment has produced a regressive tax structure. The results indicate the
direction of inequities should be considered with caution. It is possible that a
statewide policy for tax burden redistribution could incorporate the property tax
into its present progressive state as a tax on more wealthy households and a tax
break for lower income households. The instruments currently available in Indiana
that are designed to reduce the property tax burden favor those households that
own older, low-value housing and those households that carry a mortgage.
This is not to suggest that ﬁndings from this study can be directly extended to
the state as a whole. A more comprehensive study incorporating additional urban
areas along with rural communities would provide more enlightenment on the
assessment throughout the state. Further, it is possible that Bloomington is an
anomaly due to the fact that it is home to Indiana University. Bloomington has a
large proportion of single-family residential dwellings that have been converted
to rental properties for occupancy by college students. One outcome of this
arrangement has been to inﬂate rental rates, which in turn have inﬂated the market
value of traditionally affordable housing. The impact to the study is lower assessed
value to market value ratios for houses in the lower end of the market, potentially
driving a progressive anomaly.
Furthermore, focusing solely on the regressivity-progressivity aspects of the
property tax as it relates to the market value of the housing stock is limiting. A
broader analysis could attempt to relate tax inequities to speciﬁc elements of
properties—namely the location or neighborhood, the age of the structure,
demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods and the type of dwelling. Part
of Indiana’s problem is that the Regulation 17 rules for assessors are complex and
require extensive individual interpretation. One example of this is the generally
progressive nature of depreciation schedules. If employed blindly and without
adjustment, owners of new homes invariably pay more taxes than owners of
comparably priced older homes. It is anticipated that such characteristics present
possibilities for assessor error under the current Indiana system much as they do
in other states where market value serves as the basis for the property tax.
Identifying the sources of progressive inequity beyond the value of the house
would aid in the structuring of policy directives for assessment procedures for
Indiana and provide insight for similar discussions across the nation.
 Endnotes
1 Indiana does utilize an estimate of market value for the estimate of the land as though
vacant. Indiana does not, however, rely on any form of market value for the structures
or any combination of land and structures.
2 Indiana relies on a reproduction cost method for the structures with construction cost
components based on 1991 values from the Marshall & Swift Cost Manual with
adjustments for the 1996 assessment. Physical depreciation ranging from 5% to 85%342  Smith
is applied on the basis of age and condition. No allowance is made for other factors
such as location, neighboring properties, or functional obsolescence. County land
commissions, made up of county citizens knowledgeable about local real estate values,
determine land values for assessment.
3 State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (Ind.
1998).
4 As a postscript, the assessment procedure has been adjusted to include both cost
estimates and similar depreciation schedules from current issues of the Marshall & Swift
Cost Manuals. There is very likely to be a delay in the 2000 reassessment due to debate
in the legislature as to the level of training required for assessors and the limited vacant
land information available to incorporate the element of value.
5 The author would like to thank the Bloomington Board of REALTORS, the
Bloomington Department of Housing and Neighborhood Development, and the Monroe
County Assessor’sO f ﬁce for providing access to the data for this research.
6 The use of logarithms in the development of hedonic models is designed to hold the
variance of the disturbance term constant Cheng (1974), and to recognize the expectation
of a particular attribute’s diminishing inﬂuence on the dependent variable.
7 The exponential model requires transforming the dependent variable. For the semi-log
model, the independent variables receive log-transformations, and for the double-log
both the dependent and independent variables are transformed.
8 Given the similarities of the Cheng and Kochin and Parks models, and the fact that tests
of both models yielded nearly identical results, only the results from the Cheng model
will be presented.
9 The hedonic index adjustment eliminates the need to incorporate the IAAO or Clapp
time variable into the models. The time variable assumes that there are linear adjustments
to the sales price across the period of time observed. By incorporating the hedonic
approach, indexes for speciﬁc years are estimated thereby by recognizing differences
that occur in depreciation and appreciation rates over time.
10 The Clapp model in the case of this study may be inappropriately deﬁned due to the
fact that the only inﬂuences on assessed value from the market are the value estimates
of the land as though vacant, and the inﬂationary ﬁgures associated with the structural
cost components. The model is retained in this study to serve as a check against the
other models in light of the ambiguity of the previous results. While Clapp’s intention
was to incorporate both sales price and assessed value in the deﬁnition of market value,
the instrumental variable is nothing more than a scale ranking of the two variables.
Furthermore, in previous comparative tests, the Clapp model offered consistently
conservative results when compared to the other models.
11 The knots are applied in keeping with the instrumental variable in the Clapp 2SLS model
where the knots divide the data roughly into thirds by sales price. The placement of the
two knots creating the second derivative curve is based on the total indexed observation
set. Also, a cubic spline similar to Sunderman et al. was run on the data producing
similar results to that of the piecewise spline model.
12 The variable denoted as Z represents a categorization of the sales price observations
coded 1 if the house has both a sales price rank and an assessed value rank in the
highest one-third of the observations, 1 if the house has a sales price and an assessed
value rank in the bottom one-third of the observation set and 0 otherwise.Models for Vertical Inequity in Property Tax  343
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